Banking sector globalization and bank performance: A comparative analysis of low income countries with emerging markets and advanced economies  by Ghosh, Amit
Ab
a
p
o
d
g
i
©
J
K
1
c
u
b
i
t
m
a
s
w
fi
o
t
n
h
1Available  online  at  www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
HOSTED BY
Review of Development Finance 6 (2016) 58–70
Banking sector globalization and bank performance: A comparative analysis
of low income countries with emerging markets and advanced economies
Amit Ghosh ∗
Department of Economics, Illinois Wesleyan University, 1312 Park Street, PO Box 2900, Bloomington, IL 61702-2900, USA
Available online 3 August 2016
bstract
A key feature of financial services liberalization is the increasing presence of foreign banks in a nation. This study examines the impact of
anking sector globalization on bank profits and cost efficiency by using a panel of 169 nations spanning 1998–2013. Employing both fixed-effects
nd GMM estimations, and including banking-industry and macroeconomic controls, I find greater banking-sector globalization to reduce both
rofits and cost inefficiency, thereby reflecting increased competitiveness and informational asymmetries in host markets, as well as assimilation
f better technology, managerial practices by domestic banks. The results are further examined for nations across different levels of economic
evelopment and with different degrees of foreign bank presence. Only in emerging markets and in nations with more than 50% foreign banks,
reater banking sector globalization positively affects profits. From a policy perspective, the findings call for banking regulatory authorities to
mplement polices to reduce informational asymmetries in host markets. 2016 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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vices by banks (see Klomp and Haan, 2015 on the impact of
bank regulation on industry risk). Yet the recent global finan-
cial crisis has not left the banking system unscathed in almosteywords: Foreign bank entry; Bank profitability; Cost efficiency; Economic d
.  Introduction
The banking industry was in the eye of the recent global finan-
ial crisis (henceforth GFC) where several nations witnessed
nprecedented declines in banks’ earnings. Such deteriorating
ank performance is often a harbinger of bank failures and bank-
ng crises, along with their subsequent adverse consequences on
he overall economy. Therefore, the determinants of bank perfor-
ance have attracted the interest of academic research as well
s of bank management, financial markets and bank supervi-
ors, as a soundly performing banking industry is better able to
ithstand negative shocks and contribute to the stability of the
nancial system.
The last two decades have seen a rapid increase in the process
f banking-sector globalization. However, arguments suppor-
ing a policy of openness toward the banking industry in a host
ation are far from universally accepted. In the aftermath of the∗ Tel.: +1 309 556 3191.
E-mail address: aghosh@iwu.edu
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ecent global financial crisis, there has been considerable aca-
emic focus and policy attention on the roles of foreign banks in
reating economic vulnerability in host countries (Cetorilli and
oldberg, 2012a,b; De Haas and Van Horen, 2011).1
In the backdrop of this financial landscape, the present study
xamines the impact of the banking sector globalization on two
ey facets of bank performance – profitability and cost efficiency
y using a panel dataset of 169 nations encapsulating the most
pdated time period 1998–2013. The past two decades is marked
y increase in financial globalization, especially in low income
ountries and emerging markets. One aspect of such liberal-
zation is the introduction of regulatory reforms in the banking
ector as well as participation in a wider range of financial ser-1 With economic downturn in their home nation, foreign banks may receive
ess financial support from their parent banks. Hence, this is reflected in their
wn reduced lending operations in the host nation, causing the domestic banking
ndustry to suffer as well.
ll rights reserved.
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ny nation. A conspicuous feature of the banking industry in
ost nations was declining bank profits. This has sparked a
urgeoning body of literature in scrutinizing the determinants
f bank profitability. Such studies have ranged from individ-
al country specific studies like Athanasoglou et al. (2008)
n Greece, Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) on Switzerland,
arcia-Herrero et al. (2009) on China; Sufian and Habibullah
2012) on Indonesia; to multi-country panel studies like that of
ietrich and Wanzenried (2014) for low-, middle-, and high-
ncome countries; Brissimis et al. (2008), Goddard et al. (2013),
asiouras and Kosmidou (2007), Staikouras and Wood (2004)
or several EU nations. In this context, the present study makes
hree key contributions to the literature. First, using different
easures of banking sector globalization, I examine their impact
n bank performance. Secondly, I scrutinize not only the macro-
conomic and external determinants of bank performance but
lso the banking-industry specific factors. Thirdly, I provide
 comparative perspective by examining the results for low
ncome countries (LICs) with emerging and developing market
conomies (EMs) and advanced economies (AEs).2 I also cover
he widest possible range of nations for the period 1998–2013.
From the perspective of development finance, in LICs and
o an extent in EMs, there are significant informational asym-
etries that increase the cost of acquiring soft information by
oreign banks, on the basis of which a large share of potential bor-
owers are identified. Thus, the understanding the implication of
anking sector globalization on host nations bank performance
s important for the development of the domestic banking indus-
ry. From the host nation’s policymakers point of view, economic
uccess of any nation intrinsically hinges on the tradeoff between
xternal policy choices and their internal consequences. One
uch external policy choice, very relevant in LICs and EMs, is
he extent of banking sector openness. Hence, in guiding eco-
omic policy, the findings of the analysis will shed light on
egulatory measures for central bankers and governments, but
lso for adequate risk management by banks.
The benefits and costs of banking sector globalization have
een hotly debated in the media, policy forums, and academic
onferences. Arguments in favor of opening a nation’s banking
ector to foreign ownership are made under several premises.
irst, some contend that a foreign bank presence increases the
mount of funding available to domestic projects by facilitating
nflows of capital. Such a presence may also increase the stabil-
ty of available lending to the host nation by diversifying funding
ases, and hence increasing the overall supply of domestic credit.
econdly, others argue that foreign banks improve the quality,
ricing, and availability of financial services, both directly as
roviders of such enhanced services and indirectly through com-
etition with domestic financial institutions. Thirdly, foreign
ank presence is said to improve financial system infrastructure
 including accounting, transparency, and financial regulation
 and stimulate the increased presence of supporting agents
2 These nations are categorized under these categories following the World
conomic Outlook (2012) of the IMF. Appendix A provides the complete list
f nations.
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uch as ratings agencies, auditors, and credit bureaus. Also their
resence might enhance the ability of regulatory institutions to
easure and manage risk effectively. Foreign banks are backed
y their parent banks, so may be perceived as safer than domestic
ounterparts, especially in times of economic crisis. Last but not
east, foreign banks may be less susceptible to political pressures
nd less inclined to lend to connected parties. These forces imply
ositive economic effects of a foreign bank presence in a host
ation (see, Dages et al., 2000; Levine, 1996, among others).
In rebuttal to these points those opposed to foreign bank par-
icipation argue that because foreign banks have weaker ties with
ost markets and have more alternative business opportunities
han domestic banks, they are more likely to be fickle lenders
Cull and Peria, 2007). There is also the potential that they could
mport shocks from their home countries. Other economists have
rgued that foreign-owned banks will in fact decrease the stabil-
ty of bank credit provision by withdrawing more rapidly from
ocal markets in the face of a crisis either in the host or home
ountry (Peek and Rosengren, 2000). Yet others argue that for-
ign banks “cherry pick” the most lucrative domestic markets
r customers, leaving the less competitive domestic institutions
o serve other, riskier customers and increasing the risk borne
y domestic institutions. Moreover, independent of the effect
n aggregate credit, the distribution of credit may be affected,
esulting in redistribution and potential crowding out of some
egments of local borrowers. This may lead to rising income
nequality or higher rural–urban divide (see Berger et al., 2005;
ages et al., 2000; Detragiache et al., 2008).
The effect of foreign banks on profits and costs in host mar-
ets are also theoretically debatable. On the one hand, foreign
ank presence might lead to higher profitability as foreign bank’s
echnological edge is relatively strong, and these often inter-
ationally well-known banks might also have lower costs of
aising funding. The benefits of newer technology can spill-over
o domestic banks leading to higher profits for the entire bank-
ng industry. On the other hand, foreign banks might be less
rofitable as they may not be strong enough to overcome infor-
ational disadvantages (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999).
heir presence will also increase competition for domestic
anks, thereby reducing profits for all.
Foreign bank entry is also expected to improve cost effi-
iency in host markets. These banks typically bring new and
etter skills, management techniques, training procedures and
echnology, that positively spill-over to the domestic banking
ndustry. Thus, foreign banks may boost efficiency by stimu-
ating competition on the host-nation’s banking industry that
ill put downward pressure on overhead expenses and hence
mprove cost efficiency (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 1998). Any asso-
iated improvements in managerial efficiency and organizational
tructure with increase in foreign bank presence is expected
o result in a decline in operating expenses (Claessens et al.,
001). Similarly, Berger and Hannan (1998) discuss the pos-
ibility that with an increase in foreign bank entry, domestic
ank managers may be forced to give up their sheltered ‘quiet
ife’ and exert greater focus on cost efficiency. In contrast, for-
ign bank entry might spark better monitoring and supervision
n the part of domestic banks as well. If monitoring costs are
60 A. Ghosh / Review of Development Finance 6 (2016) 58–70
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Fig. 1. Average return on assets.
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Fig. 3. Average overhead costs-to-assets.
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Fig. 2. Average net interest margins.
eflected in overhead costs, such costs may actually increase
ith increase in foreign presence in the host nation’s banking
ndustry (Detragiache et al., 2008).
These contrasting arguments call for a much needed exam-
nation of the implications of banking sector globalization on
ank performance that is presently lacking. The remainder of the
aper proceeds as follows. Section 2, provides some trends and
atterns of bank performance and on the extent of banking sector
lobalization. Section 3, presents the econometric models and
he various determinants of banking profits. Section 4, discusses
he results. Section 5 unveils results for countries across different
evels of economic development. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
.  Banking  proﬁts  and  banking-sector  globalization:
rends and  patterns
.1.  Measuring  bank  performance
As noted earlier, I capture banking-sector performance by
wo measures, banks’ profits and cost efficiency. Bank profits are
est measured by return on assets (ROA) – commercial bank’s
et after-tax income to total assets. ROA reflects the ability of a
ank’s management to generate profits from the bank’s assets.
hus, it indicates how effectively the bank’s assets are managed
o generate revenues. I also measure profits by net interest mar-
in (NIM) – the difference between bank’s interest income and
nterest expenses scaled by total assets.
Figs. 1 and 2 show the yearly averages of banks’ ROA and
IM, respectively, for the entire sample of nations and also in
Ms, LICs and AEs. Two interesting facts are revealed. Bank
rofits are highest in LICs reflecting impediments to market
b
a
CFig. 4. Average cost-to-income.
ompetition. Secondly, banks ROA were negative in AEs during
008–2009 indicating these nations to be the origins of the GFC.
Cost efficiency is measured by banks overhead costs-to-assets
atio (OCA). It is defined as operating costs such as administra-
ive costs, wages and compensation to employees, advertising
xpenses, property costs, exclusive of banks interest payments
nd taxes. Higher OCA reflects more cost inefficiency. Fig. 3
resents the time series of the annual averages of OCA, again
or the entire sample of nations as well as in LICs, EMs and AEs.
n ocular view reveals a clear pattern. The banking industry is
east cost efficient in LICs as one would expect, followed by that
n EMs while it is most cost efficient in AEs. A similar pattern
s emerged in Fig. 4 that uses banks cost-to-income ratio (CIR)
s another measure of cost efficiency.
.2.  Some  trends  and  pattern  in  banking  sector
lobalization
There are primarily two reasons that drive foreign banks to
nter another country. First in search of higher profits and more
iversification opportunities. Foreign banks from a given home
ountry have entered a host nation either through extending
ranches and subsidiaries of parent banks or through mergers
nd acquisitions with private banks in the host nation. Secondly,
overnments of host nations have increased the accessibility of
xpanding services for foreign banks. In some cases, foreign
ank entry into previously restricted markets has occurred in the
ftermath of a crisis or political upheaval. Goldberg (2009) and
laessens and Horen (2012) provide recent trends and patterns.
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Fig. 5. Foreign banks-to-total banks.
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assets are perceived to have a safer asset portfolio and hence
earn lower profits. This is measured by Liquid Assets to Deposits
and Short Term Funding.3 The share of liquid assets reflects theFig. 6. Loans to non-resident banks-to-GDP.
Fig. 5 shows the yearly averages of the percent of foreign
anks to total banks. A foreign bank is a bank where 50% or
ore of its shares are owned by foreigners. Across this time
eriod of study LICs had on average the highest share of for-
ign banks in their domestic banking industry, followed by that
n EMs. Pervasive market inefficiencies and outmoded bank-
ng practices that exist in LICs incentivize foreign banks to
nter these nations to reap higher profits, possibly outweighing
nformational disadvantages they may face.
I use a second measure to capture the extent of banking sec-
or globalization – the ratio of loans from non-resident banks
o GDP of a nation. Fig. 6 shows the annual average of this
easure. For most of the time period of analysis, AEs have the
ighest share of loans from non-resident banks in their domestic
arkets, followed by that in EMs.
.  Variable  description  and  data
The dataset comprises of a balanced panel of 169 countries
panning the period 1998–2013. The greater country coverage
ields statistically more reliable results on the effect of bank-
ng sector globalization. Secondly, the larger sample allows
s to examine whether different banking and macroeconomic
ariables are more effective in countries at different levels of
conomic development. Thirdly, time-series dimension of the
ata allow us to ask how these variables change over time, con-
erge across countries, or both. Fourthly, the panel dataset allow
s to analyze the consequences of institutional reforms on bank-
ng sector globalization, thereby avoiding some econometric
oncerns about cross-sectional work. fnt Finance 6 (2016) 58–70 61
Bank profits are modeled as a function of banking-industry
pecific factors (Xji,t), financial (Xki,t) and macroeconomic vari-
bles (Xli,t) that are explained below:
i,t =  α +  β0Xji,t +  β1Xki,t +  β2Xli,t (1)
.1.  Banking-industry  speciﬁc  determinants  of  proﬁtability
Capitalization: The effect of capitalization on bank profits is
mbiguous. Banks with higher capital-to-asset ratios are con-
idered relatively safer and less risky compared to institutions
ith lower capital ratios. Furthermore, a large share of capital
ncreases creditworthiness as bank capital acts as a safety net
n the case of adverse developments like potential bankruptcy
Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011, 2014; Staikouras and Wood,
004). Banks with higher capital-to-assets ratios normally have
 reduced need for external funding, which again has a positive
ffect on their profitability (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). In
ddition, more capitalized banks have a high franchise value,
o have incentives to remain well capitalized and engage in
rudent lending (Garcia-Herrero et al., 2009). On the contrary,
n excessively high capital-to-assets ratio could signify a bank
s operating over cautiously and ignoring profitable investment
pportunities. In line with the conventional risk–return hypoth-
sis, there is an inverse relationship between capitalization and
rofits. I proxy capitalization by the ratio of total equity capital
o total bank assets.
Industry  size: On the one hand, larger size banking industry
hould reduce costs by reaping economies of scale or scope.
n fact, more diversification opportunities that come in a big-
er market should allow banks to maintain (or even increase)
rofits while lowering risk. On the other hand, in large sized
arkets banks will face more competitive pressures. This com-
ounded with larger agency costs, and higher costs of monitoring
ore loans might lower bank profits (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006;
asiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). Industry size is measured by
otal assets divided by GDP for each nation. This will also proxy
or banking sector’s overall level of development (Demirguc-
unt and Huizinga, 1999).
Industry  structure: Profits are typically higher in a banking
ndustry that is less competitive. A small number of banks may
e able to collude either implicitly or explicitly, or exploit their
arket power independently, by paying lower rates on deposits,
harging higher rates on loans and fees, and earn higher pro-
ts. Larger banks also benefit from economies of scale. Highly
oncentrated markets are therefore inherently more profitable.
ndustry structure is measured by bank concentration ratios,
ssets of the assets of three largest commercial banks as a share
f total commercial bank assets in a country.
Liquidity  risks: Banks with a higher share of more liquid3 Liquid assets include cash and due from banks, trading securities and at
air value through income, loans and advances to banks, reverse repos and cash
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ank’s ability to convert deposit liabilities into income earning
ssets, which, to a certain extent, also reflects a bank’s operating
fficiency.
Banks’ costs: Reflects the efficiency of bank’s management.
osts are measured by the ratio of non-interest expenses to total
ssets (OCA). A reduction in costs, driven by improved man-
gerial efficiency, is expected to increase profitability (Goddard
t al., 2013; Athanasoglou et al., 2008).
Bank  diversiﬁcation: Banks income or earning streams can
e decomposed into two components – interest and non-interest
ncomes. The former includes traditional commercial bank
ctivities like interest earned from different types of loans, and
nvestment securities. The latter includes investment banking,
sset management and insurance underwriting, fee-paying and
ommission-paying services, trading and derivatives. With a
eterogeneous mix of countries it is imperative to control for
iversification. In general, more diversified banks are able to
djust to adverse market shocks and are expected to earn higher
rofits.4 Following convention in the literature, I measure diver-
ification by the share of non-interest income-to-total income in
ach nation.
Balance  sheet  structure: A larger proportion of deposits
hould, increase profitability as they constitute a more stable
nd cheaper funding compared to borrowed funds. This will be
easured by bank deposits-to-GDP, as in Garcia-Herrero et al.
2009).
.2.  Financial  structure
Market  risk: It captures the probability of default of a coun-
ry’s banking system. Again following risk–return trade-off,
igher risks should lead to more profits. This is measured by
ank-z score that compares the buffer of a country’s banking
ystem (capitalization and returns) with the volatility of those
eturns, i.e., sum of ROA and equity capital-to-assets divided by
tandard deviation of (ROA).
Financial  development: The sample of countries is marked
y wide variation in the maturity of their overall financial mar-
ets. As stock markets develop, better availability of information
ncreases the potential pool of borrowers, making it easier for
anks to identify and monitor them. This raises the volume of
usiness for banks, making higher margins possible. In this set-
ing, easier equity finance may increase rather than decrease
he demand for debt finance, reflecting that these sources
f finance are complements (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga,
999; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). Financial development
s measured by stock market capitalization-to-GDP. A positive
oefficient will capture the complementarity between debt and
quity financing.
ollaterals. Deposits and short term funding includes total customer deposits
current, savings and term) and short term borrowing (money market instru-
ents, CDs and other deposits).
4 In rebuttal, one can argue that a shift toward non-interest income may not
mprove risk-adjusted returns, because returns on non-retail business are more
olatile than returns for retail banking (see, Goddard et al., 2013).
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Economic  development: The level of economic develop-
ent reflects differences in banking technology, the mix of
anking opportunities, and any other aspects of banking reg-
lations omitted in other variables. This is measured by real
DP per capita, similar to that by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga
1999).
.3.  Macroeconomic  fundamentals
Real  GDP  growth: Higher economic growth implies both
ower probabilities of individual and corporate default and an
asier access to credit. Demand for loans increases during eco-
omic upswings. So, bank profitability is typically procyclical
Staikouras and Wood, 2004).
Inﬂation: An inflation rate fully anticipated by the bank’s
anagement implies that banks can appropriately adjust inter-
st rates in order to increase their revenues faster than their
osts and thus acquire higher economic profits. So the rela-
ionship between inflation and bank profitability depends on
hether banks’ wages and other operating expenses increase
t a faster rate than inflation. Inflation is generally associated
ith higher profitability as it implies additional earnings from
oat, which tend to compensate for the higher labor costs,
.e., more employee compensation (Athanasoglou et al., 2008;
emirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Dietrich and Wanzenried,
014; Garcia-Herrero et al., 2009; Pasiouras and Kosmidou,
007).
Real  interest  rates: Higher rates typically foster profitabil-
ty. This may reflect the fact that demand deposits frequently
ay zero or below market rates, while higher real interest
ates increases the borrower’s repayment rates. I measure this
y short-term nominal interest rates (either money market
r 3-month government treasury bills) adjusted for inflation.
able 1 enlists all the variables along with their summary
tatistics.
.  Econometric  model  and  results
.1.  Methodology
Following convention in the bank performance literature, I
mploy both static and dynamic estimation techniques. The
tatic framework uses a fixed effects estimation model that
ontrols for the effect of time-invariant unobserved heterogene-
ty across countries, captured by country-specific dummies.
ecause the regression analysis is limited to a specific set
f countries and all our variables are time varying, I find it
easonable to use this estimation technique as one of the meth-
ds. Moreover, the use of country-specific effects addresses the
mitted-variables bias problem. Also the fixed effects model
llows controlling for country-invariant but time variant unob-
erved factors (like institutional and regulatory changes in the
anking sector) by using time dummies. This is especially rele-
ant in light of several institutional and regulatory changes in the
anking sector of most nations. This estimation further allows
he unobserved country specifics to be arbitrarily correlated with
he determinants of bank profits. Under the assumption of strict
A. Ghosh / Review of Development Finance 6 (2016) 58–70 63
Table 1
Summary statistics.
Variables Source Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N
ROA GFD, FRED 1.267 21.120 −109.490 3.338 2486
NIM GFD, FRED 4.981 39.237 −3.865 3.292 2493
Asset concentration GFD, FRED 72.472 100.000 7.248 21.006 2206
Diversification GFD, FRED 38.594 97.718 0.000 15.776 2513
Capital-to-assets GFD, FRED 9.574 30.600 −8.421 4.061 1574
Bank assets-to-GDP GFD, FRED 55.739 349.994 0.631 48.692 2440
Bank deposits-to-GDP GFD, FRED 48.442 394.597 1.691 45.075 2476
Liquid assets-to-deposits FRED 40.279 244.817 0.322 26.704 2530
Bank z-score GFD, FRED 15.399 74.129 −21.224 10.780 2452
OCA GFD, FRED 4.220 58.774 0.010 3.578 2493
CIR GFD, FRED 59.029 412.976 3.806 20.313 2504
Non-resident bank loans-to-GDP FRED 67.285 5954.646 0.000 332.803 2671
Foreign bank-to-total banks GFD, FRED 39.435 100.000 0.000 26.935 2065
Real GDP growth WDI 4.134 104.485 −62.077 5.537 2662
log(inflation) WDI 17.797 24,411.030 −35.837 482.759 2566
log(real GDP per capita) WDI 8.072 11.382 4.804 1.613 2652
log(real interest rates) WDI 0.004 0.543 −4.147 0.139 2419
log(population) WDI 15.864 21.029 11.151 1.821 2704
Mnemonics are: GFD – Global Financial Development, The World Bank Group, FRED: Economic Database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, WDI – World
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variables and fail to expunge their endogenous components,
a telltale sign being high Hansen test p-values. In the results
presented next, I address this following Roodman (2009a,b) by
limiting the lags in GMM-style instruments and by collapsing
the instruments.5evelopment Indicators, The World Bank Group.
xogeneity it also takes into account the country-specific differ-
nces:
it =  a0it +  ajit(Xjit) +  akit(Xkit) +  alit(Xlit) +  μi +  λt +  εit
(2)
here it denotes profits in the banking industry of country i
n period t; i represents each nation and t  each year; μ  refers
o country fixed effects, λ  is time fixed effects and εit is an
ndependently and identically distributed error term.
Bank profits show a tendency to persist over time, reflect-
ng impediments to market competition, informational opacity
nd/or sensitivity to macroeconomic shocks to the extent that
hese are serially correlated (Berger et al., 2000). Excess profit
rises either through the exploitation of market power by
ncumbent banks, or because incumbents are more efficient or
nnovative in the production or distribution of financial services.
ver time, entry stimulates competition, and eventually elimi-
ates any excess profit (Goddard et al., 2013). As a consequence,
 also specify a dynamic model by including a lagged dependent
ariable as one of the regressors. Moreover, the banking-industry
pecific variables are most likely endogenous. More profitable
anks, for example, may also be able to increase their equity
ore easily by retaining profits. Similarly, they could also pay
ore for advertising campaigns and increase their size, which,
n turn, might affect profitability. However, the causality could
lso go in the opposite direction, because the more profitable
anks can hire more personnel, and thus reduce their operational
fficiency (see Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011; Garcia-Herrero
t al., 2009). The same problem might apply to other banking
ndustry-specific explanatory variables as well.
In dynamic panels, the lagged profit term is correlated with
he error term; this is called the dynamic panel bias (Nickell,
981), thus leading to inconsistent estimates. To deal with this ussue and the aforementioned endogeneity concern, I use the
wo-step system-GMM estimation developed by Arellano and
over (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) adjusted with the
indmeijer (2005) correction for standard errors:
it =  a0it +  δπi,t−1 +  ajit(Xjit) +  akit(Xkit) +  al,it(Xlit) +  εit
(3)
 value of δ  between 0 and 1 implies persistence of profits, but
hey will eventually return to their normal level. A value close
o zero indicates an industry that is competitive, while a value
lose to one implies a less competitive structure.
This technique is especially well suited for large panels with
elatively small T, as here. The methodology essentially uses
agged values of profits in levels as well as changes in profits
s instruments, as well as lagged levels of other explanatory
ariables as corresponding instruments for the variables that
ould suffer from endogeneity. This reduces potential biases in
nite samples and any asymptotic imprecision associated with
he difference-GMM estimator. A key issue in these GMM-
stimations is that of instrument proliferation, i.e., the fact that
he number of instruments tends to explode with the number of
ime periods. Instrument proliferation can over fit endogenous5 Panel unit root tests were performed on these variables. Variables that exhibit
nit roots in their levels form were first-differenced to induce stationarity.
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Table 2
Results for bank profits.
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3. Reg. 4 Reg. 5 Reg. 6 Reg. 7 Reg. 8
Constant 7.351 6.036 −2.894 −0.245 16.381*** 16.161*** 7.016*** 8.67***
(1.131) (0.923) (−1.41) (−0.13) (3.904) (3.709) (3.78) (3.44)
Asset concentration 0.012** 0.018*** 0.009** 0.009* −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.007
(2.127) (3.134) (2.09) (1.79) (−0.734) (−0.658) (−0.73) (−1.01)
Capital-to-assets 0.064** −0.012 0.110 0.016 0.089*** 0.099*** 0.085* −0.038
(2.015) (−0.335) (1.24) (0.14) (4.37) (4.307) (1.70) (−0.28)
Diversification −0.006 −0.016*** −0.014 −0.011 −0.047*** −0.047*** −0.017* −0.016
(−0.919) (−2.389) (−1.29) (−1.24) (−11.153) (−10.673) (−1.93) (−1.44)
Liquid assets-to-deposits 0.003 0.004 0.013 0.016 −0.003 −0.002 −0.001 −0.004
(1.071) (1.347) (1.16) (1.42) (−1.332) (−1.078) (−0.09) (−0.59)
OCA −0.071*** −0.018 0.163 0.092 −0.19*** −0.198*** 0.028 0.047
(−2.885) (−0.723) (1.54) (1.17) (−11.898) (−11.67) (0.42) (0.66)
Deposits-to-GDP −0.005 −0.002 0.020 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.004
(−0.292) (−0.12) (1.08) (0.92) (0.935) (0.883) (0.70) (0.29)
Assets-to-GDP 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.004 0.007 −0.012*** −0.013*** −0.014 −0.009
(3.398) (3.109) (0.39) (0.87) (−2.351) (−2.462) (−1.20) (−0.90)
Bank z-score 0.069*** 0.072*** 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.023*** −0.005 −0.001
(6.457) (6.713) (2.97) (2.95) (3.742) (3.278) (−0.35) (−0.07)
Real GDP growth 0.061*** 0.084*** 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.017 0.032
(2.729) (3.766) (2.83) (2.69) (2.895) (2.594) (0.64) (1.18)
Inflation −0.055*** −0.059*** −0.007 −0.004 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.083*** 0.104***
(−3.583) (−3.825) (−0.22) (−0.16) (3.059) (3.001) (3.56) (3.60)
Real interest rates 0.063*** 0.075*** 0.072 0.083 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.073*** 0.089***
(3.671) (4.433) (1.38) (1.27) (2.447) (2.428) (3.20) (3.51)
log(real GDP per capita) −0.935 −0.787 0.073 −0.111 −1.407*** −1.39*** −0.52*** −0.589***
(−1.261) (−1.053) (0.51) (−0.88) (−2.937) (−2.789) (−4.07) (−3.86)
Non-resident bank loans-to-GDP −0.012*** −0.001* 0.001
(−3.185) (−1.76) (0.379)
Foreign bank-to-total banks −0.028* −0.033* 0.001 −0.027*
(−1.634) (−1.68) (0.057) (−1.91)
ROA(t−1) 0.183*** 0.155*** 0.28*** 0.281***
(7.07) (9.95) (3.82) (3.69)
Adj. R2 0.356 0.389 0.813 0.815
F-stat 5.738 6.443 24.34 54.31 38.33 38.46 14.58 12.61
N 1218 1129 1182 1096 1217 1127 1182 1095
No. of cross-sections 115 105 115 105 115 105 115 105
No. of instruments 94 94 94 94
AR(1) −1.74* −1.71* −3.25*** −3.03***
p-value (0.091) (0.09) (0.001) (0.002)
AR(2) −0.43 −0.31 1.02 1.39
p-value (0.669) (0.759) (0.301) (0.165)
Difference-in-Hansen 5 4.99 3.23 3.79
p-value (0.287) (0.288) (0.52) (0.435)
Terms in brackets denote z-stats based on robust standard errors clustered in countries. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Coefficients in
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iold are statistically significant. GMM estimations include time dummies.
.2.  Bank  proﬁt  results
Table 2 presents the results.6 Columns 1–2 show the results
sing ROA as the measure of bank profits. Greater asset con-
entration, reflecting a more imperfectly competitive industry
ncreases bank profits, with a 1% rise in concentration raising
rofits by about 0.01–0.02%. Greater capitalization of banks
s also beneficial for bank profitability. In concrete terms, an
6 The stock market capitalization-to-GDP is available for a much smaller sub-
et of countries, so including this reduces the sample size substantially. Hence,
he results presented here exclude stock market capitalization-to-GDP.
r
s
r
r
a
p
cncrease of the capital-to-assets ratio by 1% leads to an average
ncrease of ROA by 0.06%. Both increases in diversification and
verhead costs reduce bank profits while liquidity and balance
heet structure are statistically insignificant. Greater banking
ndustry size increases profits in the fixed effects estimations,
eflecting that banks reap certain economies of scale in large
ized markets. Higher z-score, signifying overall greater market
isks, also positively and significantly raises profits, following
isk–return convention. Looking at the macroeconomic vari-
bles, both real GDP growth and real interest rates raise bank
rofits while inflation has a negative impact. Real GDP per
apita is statistically insignificant. In the dynamic system-GMM
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Table 3
Results for cost efficiency.
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 Reg. 6 Reg. 7 Reg. 8
Constant −18.571 −16.264 5.985 9.629*** 0.230 −97.577 58.349*** 22.476
(−0.606) (−0.478) (1.21) (2.44) (−1.39) (−0.521) (2.72) (0.97)
Capital-to-assets(t−1) 0.079** 0.117*** 0.048 −0.074 2.190 0.611*** −0.868 0.255
(2.127) (2.897) (0.50) (−0.68) (0.665) (2.73) (−1.52) (0.36)
Diversification 0.077*** 0.08*** 0.047*** 0.04*** 0.198*** 0.187*** 0.119* 0.056
(10.437) (10.659) (4.72) (3.08) (4.436) (4.498) (1.98) (0.44)
Asset concentration −0.014* −0.015** −0.008 −0.011* −0.006 −0.002 −0.023 0.003
(−1.975) (−2.145) (−0.77) (−1.81) (−0.141) (−0.058) (−0.75) (0.04)
log(Real GDP per capita) 1.462 1.420 −0.471*** −0.564*** −6.358 −7.698 −1.100 −0.018
(1.56) (1.522) (−2.88) (−2.77) (−1.125) (−1.501) (−1.44) (−0.02)
Real GDP growth −0.068*** −0.074*** −0.045* −0.029 −0.094 −0.119 −0.176 −0.150
(−2.693) (−2.786) (−1.84) (−1.10) (−0.614) (−0.805) (−1.13) (−1.03)
Inflation 0.028 0.024 0.046*** 0.042*** −0.126 0.171* 0.000 −0.145
(1.463) (1.226) (2.58) (2.61) (−1.079) (1.605) (0.000) (−1.34)
Real interest rates 0.035* 0.028 0.026 0.018 −0.106 −0.150 −0.056 0.173*
(1.751) (1.404) (1.46) (1.08) (−0.868) (−1.343) (−0.47) (1.75)
Non-resident bank loans-to-GDP −0.008* −0.001* −0.175*** −0.040
(−1.738) (−1.66) (−3.757) (−0.86)
Foreign bank-to-total banks 0.003 0.019 0.750 0.097 −0.197*
(0.124) (1.17) (0.825) (−1.68)
log(population) 0.459 0.312 −0.105 −0.183 22.149** 12.839 −0.929 0.624
(0.274) (0.166) (−0.66) (−1.60) (2.183) (1.239) (−1.34) (0.81)
OCA(t−1) 0.403*** 0.44*** 0.568*** 0.402***
(6.61) (7.26) (5.52) (5.27)
Adj. R2 0.566 0.568 0.366 0.390
F-stat 12.605 12.830 18.11 21.13 6.14 6.751263 9.44 6.06
N 1222 1136 1254 1161 1220 1134 1312 1215
No. of cross-sections 115 104 115 105 115 104 117 107
No. of instruments 93 57 60 94
AR(1) −2.92*** −2.72*** −2.68*** −2.54**
p-value (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
AR(2) −0.98 −0.98 0.96 1.41
p-value (0.327) (0.328) (0.337) (0.16)
Difference-in-Hansen 3.47 0.42 2.89 2.95
p-value (0.482) (0.812) (0.236) (0.566)
T untri
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banking-industry specific controls. Real GDP growth, real GDP
per capita, inflation and real interest rates are used to control
for macroeconomic fundamentals, similar to that by Claessens
7 AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano–Bond tests for first and second order
autocorrelation of the residuals. One should reject the null hypothesis of no firsterms in brackets denote z-stats based on robust standard errors clustered in co
old are statistically significant. GMM estimations include time dummies.
stimations shown in columns 3–4 the lagged ROA coefficient
s positively significant, reflecting persistence in profits. The
oefficient between 0.16 and 0.18 indicates a fairly competitive
ndustry for the full-sample of nations.
Turning to the two measures of banking sector globalization,
apturing the central research question of this study, a higher
hare of loans from non-resident banks as well as a greater per-
entage of foreign banks significantly reduce bank profitability.
he negative coefficients support the notion that greater banking
ector openness increases competitiveness.
Columns 5–8 show the results using NIM as another measure
f profits. Banks equity capital-to-assets, industry size and bank
-score positively and significantly increase profits. Banks asset
oncentration is now insignificant along with again liquid assets
nd deposits-to-GDP. Both real GDP growth and real interest
ignificantly increase banks NIM. Additionally, inflation rate
ow changes signs and is positively significant, implying addi-
ional interest earnings to exceed any additional compensation
xpenses. Furthermore, real GDP per capita is now negatively
ignificant in both estimation models. With higher economic
o
s
a
Ges. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Coefficients in
evelopment competitive pressures are high in the banking
ndustry, leading to lower profits.7
.3.  Bank  cost  efﬁciency  results
Much like the approach for bank profits, I use both static and
ynamic estimation to examine the impact of foreign bank pres-
nce on cost efficiency. In these estimations, I use banks equity
apital-to-assets, diversification and asset concentration ratios asrder serial correlation and not reject the null hypothesis of no second order
erial correlation of the residuals. In all specifications, the requirements are met
s suggested by the p-values of the AR(1) and AR(2) tests. These imply that the
MM results are consistent.
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Table 4
Results for ROA for countries across economic development.
Emerging markets Low income countries Advanced economies
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 1 Reg. 2
Constant 10.347 8.658 39.407*** 32.989*** −8.891 −9.511
(1.116) (0.886) (3.285) (2.317) (−0.447) (−0.569)
Asset concentration 0.014* 0.015* −0.046** −0.043* −0.006 −0.003
(1.601) (1.607) (−1.959) (−1.693) (−0.619) (−0.438)
Capital-to-assets −0.128*** −0.126*** −0.013 −0.034 0.217*** −0.327***
(−2.445) (−2.314) (−0.21) (−0.434) (3.612) (−5.065)
Diversification −0.025*** −0.025*** −0.003 0.012 0.02*** 0.000
(−2.706) (−2.546) (−0.166) (0.568) (2.297) (0.013)
Liquid assets-to-deposits 0.015*** 0.015*** −0.018*** −0.019*** 0.001 0.006*
(2.756) (2.586) (−3.441) (−3.511) (0.197) (1.612)
OCA −0.012 −0.016 −0.353*** −0.39*** −0.241*** 0.079
(−0.413) (−0.512) (−3.301) (−3.308) (−4.851) (1.497)
Deposits-to-GDP 0.008 0.021 0.005 −0.008 −0.014 −0.006
(0.231) (0.575) (0.079) (−0.115) (−0.711) (−0.343)
Assets-to-GDP 0.007 0.010 −0.004 −0.022 0.036*** 0.029***
(0.429) (0.633) (−0.082) (−0.428) (4.72) (4.927)
Bank z-score 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.261*** 0.273*** 0.018 0.017**
(6.24) (6.167) (7.609) (7.407) (1.576) (1.961)
Real GDP growth 0.076*** 0.078*** 0.044 0.028 −0.002 0.15***
(2.427) (2.372) (1.196) (0.648) (−0.044) (3.618)
Inflation −0.053*** −0.051*** 0.042 0.001 −0.32*** −0.137**
(−2.893) (−2.689) (1.047) (0.023) (−3.844) (−1.991)
Real interest rates 0.10*** 0.101*** 0.012 −0.004 −0.213*** 0.004
(4.655) (4.601) (0.28) (−0.083) (−2.868) (0.073)
log(real GDP per capita) −1.244 −1.064 −5.53*** −4.599** 0.938 1.123
(−1.144) (−0.923) (−3.287) (−2.242) (0.49) (0.696)
Non-resident bank loans-to-GDP 0.024* −0.065* −0.016***
(1.757) (−1.857) (−4.117)
Foreign bank-to-total banks −0.011 −0.016* 0.001
(−0.42) (−1.854) (0.055)
Adj. R2 0.405 0.400 0.471 0.481 0.313 0.373
F-stat 6.21 6.007 4.366 4.46 3.772 4.42
N 621 595 220 188 341 318
No. of cross-sections 54 52 32 24 29 28
Terms in brackets denote z-stats based on robust standard errors clustered in countries. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Coefficients in
b ects.
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Cold are statistically significant. Estimations include time and country fixed-eff
t al. (2001) and Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1998). I also use coun-
ry size, captured by population, as banks overhead costs is
ore likely to be higher in more populous nations. Columns
–2 of Table 3 show the results using fixed-effects estimation
or OCA while 3–4 show those using the two-step system GMM
egressions. Analogously, columns 5–8 present the results using
IR.
Greater capitalization increases overhead costs in the
xed-effects specification. Likewise more diversified business
tructure enhances OCA due to increases in monitoring costs,
n both the fixed effects as well as system-GMM specifications.
he results imply banks incur greater operating expenses in order
o generate more income from alternative sources. In contrast,
anks reap more cost efficiency in more imperfectly competi-
ive concentrated industries. Such, cost efficiency is also attained
ith higher real GDP growth, asserting the procyclical nature
f banks cost efficiency. Real interest rates also raise OCA. In
he systems-GMM estimations, inflation has a positively signif-
cant impact on OCA. Higher economic affluence also lowers
f
tost inefficiency. Moreover, lagged values of OCA have a pos-
tively significant effect, with a 1% rise in one year increases
CA by 0.40–0.44% in the next. Noticeworthy, loans from non-
esident loans-to-GDP has a negatively significant impact on
CA supporting the view that greater banking sector globaliza-
ion increases cost efficiency.
Results using banks CIR show less statistical significance for
he banking-industry specific as well as macroeconomic vari-
bles. Both banks equity capital and diversification are again
ositively significant as is the case with real interest rates
nd population. Pointedly, loans from non-resident loans-to-
DP is again negatively significant in the fixed effects model.
ikewise, the share of foreign banks to total banks is neg-
tively significant in the GMM estimations. Much like the
ase for OCA, persistence of banks costs are also found using
IR.Given the focus of this study, I next estimate the impact of
oreign bank presence on profits and cost efficiency for each of
he three income categories.
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Table 5
Results for OCA for countries across economic development.
Emerging markets Low income countries Advanced economies
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 1 Reg. 2
Constant −35.983 −45.212 −98.101*** −98.197*** −72.550 −86.237
(−0.634) (−0.696) (−2.366) (−2.09) (−1.067) (−1.339)
Asset concentration −0.032*** −0.032*** −0.062*** −0.058*** 0.013 0.008
(−2.538) (−2.467) (−4.339) (−3.739) (1.227) (0.987)
Capital-to-assets 0.188*** 0.19*** 0.057* 0.106*** −0.007 −0.003
(2.69) (2.613) (1.721) (2.795) (−0.094) (−0.043)
Diversification 0.127*** 0.124*** −0.008 −0.020 0.007 0.022***
(10.723) (10.107) (−0.679) (−1.383) (0.708) (2.808)
Real GDP growth −0.132*** −0.133*** 0.011 0.032 0.058 −0.042
(−3.159) (−3.003) (0.452) (1.121) (0.971) (−0.878)
Inflation 0.023 0.021 0.000 −0.002 0.147 0.130
(0.863) (0.779) (−0.001) (−0.064) (1.444) (1.545)
Real interest rates 0.031 0.029 0.020 0.012 −0.054 −0.067
(1.111) (1.009) (0.719) (0.392) (−0.563) (−0.868)
log(real GDP per capita) 2.583 2.533 −0.203 −2.396* −0.496 0.773
(1.395) (1.345) (−0.166) (−1.66) (−0.229) (0.421)
Non-resident bank loans-to-GDP −0.009* −0.029* 0.018
(−1.651) (−1.874) (0.850)
Foreign bank-to-total banks −0.009* −0.032*** 0.035
(−1.638) (−2.542) (1.394)
log(population) 0.908 1.498 6.463*** 7.168*** 4.688 4.754
(0.318) (0.444) (2.794) (2.742) (1.156) (1.313)
Adj. R2 0.561 0.538 0.703 0.665 0.252 0.353
F-stat 11.26 10.255 11.99 10.119 3.326 4.624
N 612 589 252 212 354 333
No. of cross-sections 54 52 32 24 29 28
T untri
b ects.
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old are statistically significant. Estimations include time and country fixed-eff
.  Results  across  economic  development  and  the  extent
f foreign  bank  penetration
.1.  Results  for  emerging  markets,  low  income  countries,
nd advanced  economies
In EMs, and even more so in LICs foreign banks may be able
o realize high interest margins because they are exempt from
redit allocation regulations and other restrictions which are a
et burden on margins (Claessens et al., 2001). Furthermore,
ervasive market inefficiencies and outmoded banking practices
hat exist in these countries could allow foreign banks to reap
igher profits than domestic banks, outweighing the informa-
ion disadvantages they possibly may face. However, in AEs,
anking markets tend to be more competitive with more sophis-
icated participants. So, any technical advantages they may have
n these markets are not enough to overcome the informational
isadvantages they face relative to domestic banks.
For purposes of brevity, Table 4 presents the results using
xed-effects estimations only for banks ROA, and Table 5 for
CA. In EMs increase in banking sector globalization is pos-
tively significant in affecting profits, when using the share of
oans from non-resident banks-to-GDP. This positive coefficient
aptures the technological spill-overs from foreign banks to
he entire host nation’s banking industry. In contrast to this, in
ICs, the coefficient is negatively significant. This suggests first,
a
e
ues. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Coefficients in
hat foreign banks face substantial information bottlenecks, and
econdly their presence raises competitive pressures, thereby
educing profits for the overall industry. Gleaning at the results
or AEs, a higher share of non-resident bank loans has a nega-
ively significant on ROA. This negative coefficient implies in
Es spill-overs are less important since the technological gap
etween domestic and foreign banks is smaller with the banking
ndustry being already competitive.
For the other variables, banks asset concentration raises
rofits in EMs but has a negative effect in LICs. Greater capi-
alization raises profits in AEs but negatively influences profits
n EMs. The same applies for bank diversification. Bank liquid-
ty reduces profits in LICs but increases profits in both EMs and
Es. Bank z-score positively influences ROA in all three groups
f nations. For the macroeconomic variables, higher real GDP
rowth increases profits in both EMs and in AEs while inflation
oes just the opposite. Both these variables are insignificant in
ICs. Real interest rates positively influence bank profits in both
Ms and in AEs. Real GDP per capita lowers profits in LICs.
Moving to the results for OCA, the two measures of bank-
ng sector globalization are negatively significant in both EMs
nd LICs. This strongly supports the fact that foreign bank entry
llows the host nation’s banking sector to reduce costs as they
ssimilate superior banking techniques and practices from for-
ign entrants. This also forces domestic bank managers to give
p their ‘sheltered quiet’ life and to exert greater effort to reach
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Table 6
Results for ROA and OCA with different degrees of foreign bank penetration.
More than 50% More than 30% More than 10% Less than 10% More than 50% More than 30% More than 10% Less than 10%
ROA ROA ROA ROA OCA OCA OCA OCA
Constant −11.156 −15.846*** −11.959*** −2.021 −112.616* −101.777*** −6.477 −9.124
(−1.209) (−2.672) (−1.673) (−0.316) (−1.829) (−3.375) (−0.261) (−0.115)
Asset concen-
tration
−0.004 −0.005 0.004 0.005 0.010 0.001 −0.028*** −0.010
(−0.353) (−0.649) (0.561) (0.437) (0.507) (0.08) (−3.359) (−0.489)
Capital-to-
assets
0.027 0.056* −0.076* 0.088 0.858 0.039 0.12*** −0.253
(0.419) (1.746) (−1.733) (0.858) (−1.195) (1.152) (2.754) (−1.292)
Diversification −0.008 −0.006 −0.017** 0.003 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.077*** 0.098***
(−0.887) (−0.98) (−2.023) (0.308) (4.179) (7.00) (8.752) (5.005)
Liquid assets-
to-deposits
0.013** 0.01*** 0.012*** −0.002
(1.983) (2.525) (2.639) (−0.794)
OCA 0.057 0.039 −0.041 0.006
(1.272) (1.148) (−1.33) (0.115)
Deposits-to-
GDP
0.013 0.005 0.008 −0.003
(1.587) (0.908) (0.772) (−0.089)
Assets-to-
GDP
−0.006 0.010 −0.016*** −0.006
(−1.024) (1.248) (−2.465) (−0.874)
Bank z-score 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.089*** 0.039***
(3.717) (5.892) (6.364) (2.84)
Real GDP
growth
0.012 0.019 0.033* 0.012 −0.071** −0.028* −0.041* −0.065
(0.619) (1.383) (1.728) (0.541) (−1.999) (−1.743) (−1.931) (−1.512)
Inflation −0.020 −0.018 −0.001 0.028 −0.023 0.013 −0.04* 0.084
(−1.183) (−1.414) (−0.052) (0.606) (−0.63) (0.768) (−1.854) (0.924)
Real interest
rates
−0.055*** −0.031** −0.006 0.024 −0.122*** −0.039* −0.030 0.121
(−2.683) (−2.042) (−0.312) (0.505) (−2.602) (−1.945) (−1.373) (1.325)
log(real GDP
per capita)
0.995 1.785*** 1.689* 0.181 3.054* 2.945*** 2.251*** −0.422
(0.92) (2.57) (1.949) (0.235) (1.69) (3.519) (2.275) (−0.299)
Foreign bank-
to-total
banks
0.023* 0.001 −0.015 −0.055 −0.028* −0.017* 0.016 0.060
(1.664) (0.066) (−1.374) (−0.487) (−1.666) (−1.813) (1.249) (0.259)
log(population) 5.751 4.841*** −0.628 0.676
(1.552) (2.655) (−0.426) (0.148)
Adj. R2 0.448 0.441 0.266 0.987 0.617 0.692 0.561 0.677
F-stat 4.967 6.135 3.854 266.729 4.589 17.192 11.626 9.514
N 285 568 898 139 250 592 907 143
No. of cross-
sections
31 60 87 14 30 60 87 14
T ountri
b ects.
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5erms in brackets denote z-stats based on robust standard errors clustered in c
old are statistically significant. Estimations include time and country fixed-eff
ost efficiency. Finally, in AEs the two coefficients are insignif-
cant; suggesting that in more developed banking markets there
s not much room to reap cost efficiency through increasing
anking sector openness. Moreover, as noted in Mathieson and
oldòs (2001), banking systems in AEs had already undergone
elaxation of controls and liberalization for a considerable period
f time, and banks faced competition not only from other banks
ut also from a variety of nonbank sources of credit (espe-
ially capital markets). Such competition had already put intense
ressures on profits and forced banks to merge and/or adopt new
echnologies to help reduce overhead costs. While foreign bank
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ees. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Coefficients in
ntry could intensify these competitive pressures, the scale of
uch an increase would typically be marginal hence showing
nsignificant effect on overhead costs.
.2.  Does  the  extent  of  foreign  bank  penetration  matter?
The overall findings so far indicate that foreign banks reduce
rofits and overhead costs in host nations. Now, if such a find-
ng is driven by informational asymmetries and higher costs
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e less for nations with high foreign bank presence, Without
irect measures of the degree to which markets and banks in
 broad cross-section of countries ameliorate information and
ransactions costs, I explore this issue in Table 6 by categorizing
ountries according to different threshold levels of foreign bank
resence: more than 10%, more than 30%, more than 50%, and
nally less than 10% on average over the period of study. The
oefficients of foreign bank share are insignificant at low lev-
ls of foreign bank penetration. Interestingly, for nations with
ore than 50 of foreign banks in their domestic banking industry
he coefficient is actually positive and significant. This implies
hen foreign banks dominate the host nation’s domestic bank-
ng industry, the benefits of their cutting edge technology, better
anagement techniques dominate other issues like local infor-
ational bottlenecks or competitive forces, leading to higher
rofits. On the other end, as pointed out in Claessens and Lee
2003), at low levels of foreign bank penetration, foreign banks
ossibly do not compete as much with local banks, but focus
ostly on servicing foreign clients and other niche markets and
ence their presence also does not generate enough competition
o reduce profits significantly.
Turning to the results for overhead costs, the share of for-
ign banks is negatively significant for nations with more than
0% and 50% of foreign banks, respectively, again underscor-
ng the beneficial effect of foreign bank entry on improving
ost efficiency through the channels of positive technological
pillovers.
.  Conclusion
The present study examines the effect of banking sector
lobalization on banks’ profits and cost efficiency. Using two
ifferent measures, I find that greater share of loans from non-
esident banks as well as a greater share of foreign banks reduces
oth profits and overhead costs in the banking industry of host
ations. Only in EMs, I find banking sector globalization to
ncrease bank profits. This finding provides an explanation for
he rapid increase in foreign bank presence in EMs over the
ast two decades. Likewise, countries with a high share of for-
ign bank presence witness a positive impact of banking sector
lobalization on bank profits.
From a development finance point of view, the negative effect
f banking sector globalization on bank profits for the entire sam-
le of nations should not be interpreted as evidence supporting
ore protectionist policies toward foreign banks. Rather they
apture increased competition that is generated by opening up
he domestic banking sector. More importantly it reflects infor-
ational disadvantages that foreign banks face that cannot be
vercome by their technological edge. This is especially relevant
n LICs. From a policy perspective, this calls for banking regula-
ory authorities like central banks in LICs to implement policies
o ameliorate informational asymmetries, especially when it is
ased on soft information, as is often the case when dealing with
mall firms. Overall, the main findings of this study are consis-
ent with the views espoused in other related studies (Claessens
t al., 2001; Claessens and Lee, 2003; Lensink and Hermes,
M
M
(
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004; Mathieson and Roldòs, 2001) that increasing foreign par-
icipation promotes competition and cost efficiency.
Additionally, the positive effect of bank equity capital found
or the full-sample of nations implies that greater capital will
ncourage more prudent lending, and therefore enhance profits.
his is especially relevant when considered in the context of
he recent discussions about capital adequacy ratios (Basel III).
anks’ profits are also an important source of equity. If banks
o not pay out (all of) their profits and keep them as equity
apital, such a strategy should lead to safer banks. The nega-
ive relationship between diversification and profits suggests that
anks that focus on non-interest earning assets suffer relatively
reater profit erosion. This supports a view that banks are more
rofitable when they focus on traditional banking services. The
egative effect of OCA on bank profits suggests that efficient
ost management is a prerequisite to improve the profitability
f banks, especially in LICs. Finally, it is imperative to sustain
conomic growth in host nations for their banking industry to
ustain profits and remain cost efficient.
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ppendix  A.  List  of  countries  covered
Afghanistan (LIC), Albania (EM), Algeria (EM), Angola
EM), Argentina (EM), Armenia (LIC), Australia (AE), Austria
AE), Azerbaijan (EM), Bahamas, The (EM) Bahrain (EM),
angladesh (LIC), Barbados (EM), Belarus (EM), Belgium
AE), Belize (LIC), Benin (LIC), Bhutan (LIC), Bolivia (LIC),
osnia and Herzegovina (EM), Brazil (EM), Brunei Darussalam
AE), Botswana (EM), Bulgaria (EM), Burkina Faso (LIC),
urundi (LIC), Cambodia (LIC), Cameroon (LIC), Canada
AE), Cape Verde (LIC), Central African Republic (LIC), Chad
LIC), Chile (EM), China (EM), Colombia (EM), Costa Rica
EM), Cote d’ Ivoire (LIC), Croatia (EM), Cyprus (AE), Czech
epublic (AE), Denmark (AE), Dominica (LIC), Dominican
epublic (EM), Djibouti (LIC), Ecuador (EM), Egypt (EM), El
alvador (EM), Equatorial Guinea (LIC), Eritrea (LIC), Estonia
EM), Ethiopia (LIC), Fiji (LIC), Finland (AE), France (AE),
abon (LIC), Gambia, The (LIC), Georgia (LIC), Germany
AE), Ghana (LIC), Greece (AE), Grenada (LIC), Guatemala
EM), Guinea-Bissau (LIC), Guyana (LIC), Haiti (LIC), Hon-
uras (LIC), Hong Kong SAR, China (AE), Hungary (EM),
celand (AE), India (EM) Indonesia (EM), Iran (EM), Iraq (EM),
reland (AE), Israel (AE), Italy (AE), Jamaica (EM) Japan (AE),
ordan (EM), Kazakhstan (EM), Korea, Rep. (AE), Kuwait (EM)
yrgyz Republic (LIC), Lao PDR (LIC), Latvia (EM), Lebanon
EM,) Lesotho (LIC), Liberia (LIC), Libya (EM), Lithuania
EM), Luxembourg (AE), Macedonia (EM), Madagascar (LIC),
alawi (LIC), Malaysia (EM), Maldives (LIC), Mali (LIC),
alta (AE), Mauritania (LIC), Mauritius (EM), Mexico (EM),
oldova (LIC), Mongolia (LIC), Morocco (EM), Mozambique
LIC), Namibia (EM), Nepal (LIC), Netherlands (AE), New
ealand (AE), Nicaragua (LIC), Niger (LIC), Nigeria (LIC),
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orway (AE), Oman (EM), Pakistan (EM),Panama (EM), Papua
ew Guinea (LIC), Paraguay (EM), Peru (EM), Philippines
EM), Poland (EM), Portugal (AE), Qatar (EM), Romania
EM), Russian Federation (EM), Rwanda (LIC), Saudi Ara-
ia (EM), Senegal (LIC), Serbia (EM), Seychelles (LIC), Sierra
eone (LIC), Singapore (AE), Slovak Republic (AE), Slove-
ia (AE), Solomon Islands (LIC), South Africa (EM), Spain
AE), Sri Lanka (EM), St. Lucia (LIC), St. Vincent & the
renadines (LIC), Sudan (LIC), Swaziland (LIC), Sweden (AE),
witzerland (AE), Syrian Arab Republic (EM), Tajikistan (LIC),
anzania (LIC), Thailand (EM), Timor-Leste (LIC), Togo (LIC)
rinidad and Tobago (EM), Tunisia (EM), Turkey (EM), Turk-
enistan (LIC), Uganda (LIC), Ukraine (EM), United Arab
mirates (EM) United Kingdom (AE), USA (AE), Uruguay
EM), Uzbekistan (LIC) Vanuatu (EM), Venezuela, RB (EM),
iet Nam (LIC), Yemen Rep. (LIC), Zambia (LIC), Zimbabwe
LIC).
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